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The Contingent Compensation of Expert
Witnesses in Civil Litigation
Financing the ever increasing costs of litigation has always been a
problem, especially for the less affluent party. In the civil context, the
contingent fee arrangement for payment of attorney fees has afforded many
an opportunity to litigate which might not otherwise have been available.
However, in those areas in which expert witnesses are necessary, where
witness fees can quickly skyrocket, no such ameliorative plan is available.
The Code of Professional Responsibility's Disciplinary Rule 7-109(C)
explicitly states the bounds of acceptable conduct in compensating wit-
nesses,' and expressly prohibits contingent payments to witnesses. A federal
district court, in Person v. Bar Association of New York, 2 recently found
this prohibition to be constitutionally defective, posing an unreasonable
and irrational barrier to litigation for the meritorious though less affluent
party. Whether the rule's prohibition is unconstitutional and, further,
whether there are viable alternatives to the present use of experts or areas
this note will explore.
WITNESS FEES
The compensation of witnesses has long been a subject for legislative
determination, 3 and contracts for compensation above the statutorily
provided level have been held highly suspect by the courts. 4 In litigation
'DR 7-109 Contact with Witness:
(C) A lawyer shall not pay, offer to pay, or acquiesce in the payment of
compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of his testimony or the
outcome of the case. But a lawyer may advance, guarantee, or acquiesce in payment
of:
(3) A reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109.
2414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). The court granted a summary judgment to plaintiff-
attorney challenging the rule in New York as an irrational prohibition unconstitutionally
barring less affluent litigants equal protection. Though the court granted a favorable ruling,
it declined to sever the motion from the ongoing antitrust action which occasioned the
challenge.
While this note was being printed, the district court's decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Person v. Bar Ass'n of N.Y., 45 U.S.L.W. 2535 (2d Cir. May 17,
1977). The appellate court found that there was no denial of a fundamental interest (access to the
courts) and that the state had a compelling interest in insuring that "judicial proceedings in New
York were free of false testimony." Id. Cf. text accompanying notes 28-30, 44-60 infra.
3See, e.g., IND. CODE § 5-7-9-4 (1976).
4See, e.g., Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857), where the court stated:
The statute regulating salaries and fees, provides that the fee of a witness shall be
thirty-four cents a day for attendance, and five cents a mile for travel. This is all the
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involving nonexperts, such payments have frequently been held unlawful.5
The contract analysis applied to such agreements is straightforward and
follows two well-defined theories.
The first theory maintains that such contracts are invalid under the
traditional analysis applied to contracts to perform an act which the
promisor is already under a duty to perform.6 Every citizen is under a duty
to appear in court and to testify to facts within his knowledge when
properly summoned.7 Further, since there is a legal compulsion to appear,
any agreement for additional compensation must fail for want of con-
sideration.8
The second and perhaps more compelling theory frequently expressed
is that such contracts are void as against public policy.9 This argument
focuses on the potential for extortion of excessive fees by a witness offering
crucial testimony' 0 as well as the potential for exaggeration or outright
perjury." I These inherent dangers of such agreements are uniformly
condemned.
A necessary exception to the prohibition against fees in excess of
statutory determination has been maintained in the area of expert testi-
mony.'2 Using the contract analysis, it is argued that while any expert is
remuneration he is entitled to for this service; and any attempt directly or indirectly
to secure more, is against the language and policy of the law
Id. at .164-65. See also Alexander v. Watson, 128 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1942); Wright v. Somers,
125 Il. App. 256 (1906); Clifford v. Hughes, 139 App. Div. 730, 124 N.Y.S. 478 (1910); In re
Ramschasel's Estate, 24 Pa. Super. 262 (1904); Dorr v. Camden, 55 W. Va. 226, 46 S.E. 1014
(1964).
:'There are exceptions to the rule, as when a witness appears pursuant to an agreement
though otherwise outside the jurisdiction of the court. Dodge v. Stiles, 26 Conn. 463 (1857):
State ex rel. Spillman v. First Bank of Nickerson. 114 Neb. -423, 207 N.W. 574 (1926); Cowles v.
Rochester F. Box Co., 179 N.H. 87, 71 N.E. 468 (1904).
66A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1430 (1962); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 552(1) (1932);
Annot., 16 A.L.R. 1457 (1922).7See. e.g., Alexander v. Watson, 128 F.2d 627, 630 (4th Cir. 1942), where the court stated,
"'The giving of testimony as facts within one's knowledge is a matter of public duty and one
may not impose any condition upon that duty which the law does not authorize." See also M.
Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 62 Misc.2d 236, 300 N.Y.S. 2d 493 (1970).
"See. e.g., Keown & McEvoy v. Verlin, 253 Mass. 374, 149 N.E. 115 (1925). where it is
stated, "Where a witness has been subpoenaed to attend at court and testify, a promise to pay
extra fees for his attendance is unenforceable to want of consideration." See also Wright v.
Somers, 125 Ill. App. 256, 258 (1906).
9See. e.g., In re Ramschasel's Estate, 24 Pa. Super. 262 (1904); Thatcher v. Darr, 28 Wyo.
452, 199 P. 938 (1921).
0Wright v. Somers. 125 Il. App. 256 (1906); In re O'Keefe, 49 Mont. 369, 142 P. 630
(1914); Quirk v. Muller, 14 Mont. 467. 36 P. 1077 (1894); In re Shapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128
N.Y.S. 852 (1911); Davis v. Smoot. 176 N.C. 538, 97 S.E. 488 (1918).
''Davi, v. Smoot. 176 N.C. 538, 97 S.E. 488 (1918). offers a particularl. vivid example,
"Idlefendant had unlawfully and willfully represented to his [plaintiff's] intestate that he
would be wot th that much to him because he would so describe his injuries to the jur. as to
make his damages much larger .... ." Id. at 539, 97 S.E. at 488.
"'See, e.g., Gordon v. Conaley, 107 Me. 286, 78 A. 365 (1910); Barrus v. Phaneuf, 166
Mass. 123. 44 N.E. 141 (1896); Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597
(1942): Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439. 105 A. 630 (1918); Note, 9 So. CAt.. L.
R v. 61 (1935). See also 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 6.
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CONTINGENT COMPENSATION
required to testify to facts within his knowledge, analyzing data, running
tests and using acquired knowledge and expertise to answer hypothetical
questions is compensable activity beyond that required of every citizen. 13 As
recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, this approaches a depri-
vation of property analysis:
The state or the United States may call upon her citizens to testify as
experts in matters involving the common weal, but that is because of the
duty which the citizen owes to his government, and is an exercise of its
sovereign power.... But the private litigant has no more right to compel a
citizen to give up the product of his brain than he has to compel the giving
up of material things. 4
Thus, contracts for compensation for the services of experts are enforceable.
The propriety of these agreements has been unquestioned in this country 5
and is expressly provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility's rule
dealing with witnesses. 16
Because of the dangers of excess compensation, courts have been rather
rigorous in their interpretation of who is an expert and when a witness
should be so designated for purposes of compensation.1 7 This scrutiny has
most frequently been seen in personal injury litigation involving the
testimony of attending physicians. It is usually held that where the witness
obtained informaiton from mere personal observation and not from extra
prepartion, he too is under a compulsion to testify to facts within his
knowledge for no more than the normal witness fee despite the increased
awareness or knowledge his expertise provided.1 8
'3"[N]o one, expert or otherwise, is required to make special investigations for the
purpose of learning or determining the facts or of accummulating evidence of forming an
opinion." 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 6. See also Stanton v. Rushmore, 112 N.J.L. 115, 169 A.
721 (1934); Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 105 A. 630 (1918).
"Pennsylvania Co. v. Philadelphia, 262 Pa. 439, 441-42, 105 A. 630, 630 (1918).
"5Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 120 N.W. 829 (1904); RESTATEMENT OF
CONTRACTS § 552(2) (1932); 31 AM. JUR. EXPERT OPINION EVIDENCE § 12 (1967).
16DR 7-109. See note I supra.
'
7See, e.g., Dixon v. People, 168 Ill. 179, 48 N.E. 108 (1897); State v. Bell, 212 Mo. 111,
III S.W. 24 (1908); Burnett v. Freeman, 134 Mo. App. 709, 115 S.W. 488 (1909). These cases
indicate that a contract for witness fees in excess of statutory fees would be void if the subject
matter can be required of the witness absent expert designation.
IsMuch of the testimony of a so-called expert is in no wise different in character
from that of any other witness .... A skilled physician discovers facts by the use of
[senses] which another man might not. But this distinction is one of degree merely,
and not of king. All men differ in their ability to observe accurately and in the
certainty of knowledge which they derive from such observation .... Any attempt to
draw a line between the exceptionally stupid and nonobservant person and others
who, by greater alertness, training or skill in observation, may acquire more
knowledge, is impracticable and irrational.
Philler v. Waukesha County, 139 Wis. 211, 214, 120 N.W. 829, 830 (1909). See McClenahan v.
Keyes, 188 Cal. 574, 206 P. 454 (1922); Swope v. State, 145 Kan. 928, 67 P.2d 416 (1937)
(examining physician held in contempt for not testifying before expert fee paid).
19771
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CONTINGENT FEES
The question of contingent payments to witnesses, both expert and
nonexpert, has arisen on occasion, and almost without exception courts
have struck down such agreements as contrary to public policy.' 9 The
court in Sherman v. Burton20 succinctly states the major reasons for such a
holding: "The plaintiff's interest in the amount of the damages furnished
a powerful motive for exaggeration, suppression, and misrepresentation, a
temptation to swell the damages so likely to color his testimony as to be
inimical to the pure administration of justice, and therefore invalid."2'
To understand why such a result is appropriate in the area of expert
testimony, it is necessary to examine the role the expert takes in a
litigation. In civil actions, an expert is usually called to establish or refute
damage claims so that an appropriate award might be forthcoming.
Though there are exceptions, as in malpractice cases, the expert is less
frequently called in the stage of determining liability-guilt or innocence. 22
Any agreement which ties compensation to the amount of the award carries
with it a tremendous incentive to perjure or exaggerate in the area in which
judge and jury have least knowledge and where the greatest need exists for
impartial guidance. Any prohibition does not so much condemn the
professional-witness as a potential liar as it recognizes the fact that such an
arrangement yields the appearance of possible complicity. It is this
appearance, or tendency which is to be avoided:
The rule applied to such contracts is not to be affected by proof that the
behavior of the parties was in fact exemplary, for it is the tendency of such
contracts which serves to generate their undesirability. Improper conduct
or bias can be predicted easily when the compensation of the witness is
directly related to the absolute amount of an award which may in turn be
dependent to a great degree on the testimony of that same witness.23
Closely connected with this concern is the recognition that the expert is
placed in the position of testifying "for" a particular litigant. 24
19See, e.g., Laos v. Soble, 18 Ariz. App. 502, 503 P.2d 978 (1973); Fist Nat'l Bank v. Hasty,
183 Ark. 519, 36 S.W.2d 967 (1931); Van Norden v. Metson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 995, 171 P.2d 485
(1946); Von Kessler v. Baker, 131 Cal. App. 654, 21 P.2d 1017 (1933); Pelkey v. Hodge, 112
Cal. App. 424, 296 P. 908 (1931); Weinberg v. Magid, 285 Mass. 237, 189 N.E. I 1I (1934);
Thomas v. Caulkett, 57 Mich. 392, 24 N.W. 154 (1885); In re Shapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128
N.Y.S. 852 (1911); Webster v. McFadden, 190 Oki. 551, 125 P.2d 987 (1942); Belfonte v. Miller,
212 Pa.Super 508, 243 A.2d 150 (1968); In re Ramschasel's Estate, 24 Pa.Super 262 (1904);
Wright v. Corbin, 190 Wash. 260, 67 P.2d 868 (1937); 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1430 (1962);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 552(2) (1932). But see Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo.
1032, 156 S.W.2d 597 (1942) (a valid contract does not become invalid because respondent-
psychiatrist was to be paid only if the litigation involving an estate were successful).
20165 Mich. 293, 130 N.W. 667 (1911) (physician bargained for percentage of recovery in
exchange for satisfaction for existing debt owed him).
21Id. at 297, 130 N.W. at 668.
22See, e.g., SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK ON THE MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY 6 (1956).
23Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. 508, 514, 243 A.2d 150, 153 (1968).
24See notes 75-78 infra & text accompanying.
[Vol. 52:671
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Cited in connection with these contingent fee contracts are elements of
champerty and maintenance. Proper applications of these prohibitions have
arisen, even when strict doctrinal definitions are maintained. 25 A distinction is
made between those agreements which look toward actual participation in
the litigation (held invalid),26 and those in which the party is merely
preparing or gathering information relevant to a possible suit, though
participation is not anticipated (held valid).27 The judicial concern for
maintaining the highest levels of honesty within a judicial proceeding and
eliminating any visible incentive to perjury is the touchstone for such a
distinction.
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY RULE
The almost uniform holdings of courts in the area seem to leave little if
any room for possible challenge. Indeed, the number of cases involving
such agreements is not substantial especially in recent years. The dis-
couraging opinions are, in part, responsible. But so too is the proliferation
of various codes of ethics generated by organizations which frequently
provide experts for litigation. Most condemn the practice of testifying as
an expert in litigation where the fee is contingent on outcome or content,
as the following suggests:
It is the opinion of the Judicial Council that the contracting for, or
acceptance of, a contingent fee by a doctor, which is based on the outcome
of litigation, whether settled or adjudicated, is unethical .... Furthemore,
the Council is of the opinion that the physician's obligation to uphold the
dignity and honor of his profession precludes him from entering into an
arrangement of this nature because, if a fee is contingent upon the
successful outcome of a claim, there is the everpresent danger that the
physician may become less of a healer and more of an advocate-a
situation that does not uphold the dignity of the profession of medicine.28
2
-1n Weinberg v. Megid, 285 Mass. 237, 189 N.E. 110 (1934), a physician sought to
enforce a contract for medical attention received by defendant after an accident. In lieu of
immediate payment, plaintiff agreed to attend her throughout her illness, "provided she agree
that his compensation would be twenty percent of the verdict recovered against the person
who caused her injuries. If, however, the verdict was against her, it was agreed that he was to
get nothing." As the court noted, this had every element of a champertous agreement. Id. at
237, 189 N.E. at 110. Note the close connection between such an arrangement and the one
proposed by the attorney in Person v. Bar Ass'n of New York, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), wherein he proposed a system of outside investors to finance the ongoing litigation.
26See, e.g., VanNorden v. Metson, 75 Cal. App. 2d 995, 171 P.2d 485 (1946); Griffith v.
Harris, 17 Wis.2d 255, 116 N.W.2d 133 (1962).27See, e.g., Wilhelm v. Rush, 18 Cal. App. 2d 366, 63 P.2d 1158 (1937); Apter v. Joffo, 32
Mich. App. 411, 189 N.W.2d 7 (1971); Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 156
S.W.2d 597 (1941); Haley v. Hollenback, 53 Mont. 494, 165 P. 459 (1917); Miller v. Anderson,
183 Wis: 163, 196 N.W. 869 (1924).
2 8AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 56-
57 (1960). See also National Interprofessional Code for Physicians and Attorneys, AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIGEST OF OFFICIAL ACTIONS 1846-1958, at 445 (1959); The Provision for
Contingent Fee Arragements of the Code of Ethics of the American Institute of Real Estate
Appraisers cited in Laos v. Soble, 18 Ariz. App. 502, 503 P.2d 978, 979 n.1 (1973); The
1977]
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The major concern reflected by such provisions is not primarily the
fear of lying or exaggerating witnesses. Rather, it is that such arrangements
heighten the suspi.ion that complicity exists, thus lowering the public
esteem of the profes ion involved.2 9
It is against such a backdrop of case and statutory law and professional
ethics codes that the CPR provision, in its present form, was drafted. The
rule limits the options available to both attorney and client as to the
financing of needed experts. It is the attorney who is frequently the contact
between client and witness, both expert and nonexpert. The demands of a
needed witness, 30 as well as the effective allocation of a client's limited
resources, are often left.to the attorney. The CPR rule serves to resolve any
potentially difficult decisions at that point in favor of systemic integrity.
Participants in a judicial proceeding must assure its propriety. As an officer
of the court, the attorney above all others has a basic interest in that goal.
Conceputally the rule seems unassailable. However, the questions remain-
ing are unresolved are whether the limitations of the rule are effective in
maintaining integrity and whether they are constitutional.
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
The case of Person v. Association of Bar of New York3 provides a
framework for constitutional interpretation of the prohibition against
contingency payment. The court's decision is based upon the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It is useful to examine the
analysis used by the Person court in light of Supreme Court rulings in
recent years.32
Provision for Contract Fee Arrangements of the Code of Ethics of the Society of Real Estate
Appraisers cited in Belfonte v. Miller, 212 Pa. Super. 508, 515, 243 A.2d 150, 154 n.5 (1968).2 9Further, it is a step foward eliminating the adversarial expert, the professional witness
with little regard for his profession.
"See, e.g., In re O'Keefe, 49 Mont. 369, 142 P. 638 (1914), where the attorney was in
contact with witnesses threatening no show or unfavorable testimony unless their compen-
sation demands were met. See also In re Shapiro, 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N.Y.S. 852 (1911).
s1414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
3 2Seemingly entrencied in modem equal protection doctrine is the two tier model of
analysis. A primary issue'in the analysis is the proper standard to be applied, which tier is
appropriate to determine constitutionality. The upper tier, or strict scrutiny, is to be applied
in classifications either disadvantaging suspect classes which now include race, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 329 U.S. 184 (1964); alienage, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971), ancestry, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948), and perhaps, in some
instances, sex, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976), or which impermissibly interfere with
a fundamental right, such as interstate travel, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
the right to vote, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). Such a classification will be
upheld only upon a showing of a compelling state interest, nearly an impossible feat. All
other statutes, regulations and classifications are subject to the lower tier, mere rationality.
Here legislation is presumed valid absent a showing of total irrationality, the justification
being that some arbitrary lines need be drawn and absent the considerations generating strict
scrutiny, the legislature is best equipped to draw those lines.
There are frequent challenges to this analytical structure. The criticism has focused on




In many litigations, especially between individuals and corporations,
disparity in means exists. The problem is whether this disparity is
unconstitutionally maintained or strengthened by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The court in Person recognizes that disparity in means, or
,wealth discrimination, alone is not sufficient to trigger the strict scrutiny of
the upper tier of modern equal protection analysis. 33
While application of equal protection analysis by the Supreme Court
in the area of economic inequality has been sporadic, the present position .
of the Court is clearly stated in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez.34
There the Court upheld a school financing plan wherein residents of
relatively poor districts received less funding for their schools than did
residents of other more affluent districts.-3  The Court discussed the
difficulties of defining such a large and amorphous class as "the poor"36,
and further found any such classification to be lacking in the rather
explicit requirements for a suspect class.3 7
This holding, which remains unchanged, marked an end to a surge of
equal protection holdings involving the elevation of indigency to a favored
analysis. Once the initial classification or interest determination is made, the analysis is
effectively completed. Should strict scrutiny be applied, it is very likely that classification will
be found to be unconstitutional. If mere rationality is to be the test, the classification is
almost certain to stand valid, with no in-depth inspection of the gray area between these
extremes. Justice Marshall developed an alternate model which, he argues, satisfies these
requirements. This is the sliding scale model first described in San Antonio School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973), and most recently forwarded in dissent in Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). It is argued that such a model allows
increased flexibility in judicial analysis as well as recognizes the necessary sophistication with
which courts must approach this analysis. Further, it would be a formal and affirmative
recognition of what the Supreme Court is already, in essence, undertaking, though not so
identifying its actions. See also Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Even the
frequent dissenters, however, recognize that the two tier model remains favored in equal
protection analysis.
53Disparity in means between the litigants is not always present, nor is total
inability to pay a needed expert the common situation. But disparity and need are
frequent, and .... it is inherent in the Rule that it must particularly forbid to the
less affluent and to the indigent a means of obtaining an equal hearing to that
accorded to a more affluent adversary in the same case.
414 F. Supp. at 146.
34411 U.S. 1 (1973).
35See Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces
of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945, 955 (1975), where it is stated: "San Antonio
School District v. Rodriguez may be seen as failing to relieve a consequence of poverty and as
a failure to provide more equal competitive opportunities for children of poverty-poor school
districts."
56411 U.S. 1, 25-29 (1973).
37The system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have none of the
traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from




status in court analysis. This line of cases, headed by Griffin v. Illinois38
and including Douglas v. California39 and Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections,4 ° has been described as cases "whose extravagent rhetoric
appeared to herald some broad constitutional advance against inequalities
of means."'4' It was not to be. Indeed, the petitioners in Rodriguez
recognized the improbability of a favorable court holding42 and attempted
to link wealth classification with another favored equal protection area,
that of a fundamental interest. 43 The Court still failed to find a proper
circumstance for invoking strict scrutiny. In Person, the disparity in
means argument was also linked with another recognized area of equal
protection adjudication -access to courts.
Access to Courts
The factual situations in both Griffin and Douglas obviously fit into a
discussion of constitutionally guaranteed access to courts. It should be
noted that in both cases, the challenging party was brought into court as a
criminal defendant. These parties are, by way of the fourth, fifth and sixth
amendments, of special and deep-rooted interest to the Court. For now,
such cases will be distinguished from civil cases in which the challenging
party is not in court by reason of alleged criminal acts.
With this distinction in mind, one of the leading cases in the area of
court access is Boddie v. Connecticut,44 a case cited in support of the
decision in Person. In Boddie, the Court held that the filing fees and court
costs associated with a divorce posed an unreasonable and unconstitutional
barrier to indigent plaintiffs, denying them due process. The Court,
through Justice Harlan, stressed two important factors.
First, Justice Harlan discussed the importance of due process in our
society and the role our judicial system plays in it.-a "monopoly over
techniques of final dispute settlement," 45 where, as in actions like this, no
38351 U.S. 12 (1956). Here the court held that petitioners were denied equal protection
when, due to lack of funds, they were denied the complete certified transcript necessary to
pursue an appeal of a criminal conviction. As stated by the Court: "There can be no equal
justice where the kind of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Id. at
19.
39372 U.S. 353 (1963) (a party may not be denied counsel on first appeal when proven
clearly indigent).
40383 U.S. 663 (1966). Here the Court overturned a state poll tax, stating, "Lines drawn
on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored." Id. at 668.
4'Wilkinson, supra note 35.42
"But in recognition of the fact that this court has never heretofore held that wealth
discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny, appellees have
not relied solely on this contention." 411 U.S. 1, 29.
43See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-34 (1969), for an example of
fundamental interest analysis in equal protection. Where a discrimination affects a
fundamental interest, strict scrutiny is applied to the classification. In Rodriguez, the
petitioners attempted to show that education was a fundamental interest. 411 U.S. at 28-29.




alternative is available. Coupled with the state monopoly over disposition
is the fundamental importance of the marriage relationship. When forged
together, these two factors produced a compelling due process argument:
[G]iven the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's
hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the
means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a
State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to
individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages. 46
Though the court added strict limiting language at the close of the
opinion, 7 many commentators felt another new area for expansion of
rights had been opened.48 For here, a plaintiff in a civil action had been
granted constitutionally protected access to the courts. 49 Justice Douglas,
in concurrence, placed the case squarely in the Griffin-Douglas line of
cases. 50 Indeed, the arguments of Justice Harlan seemed to fit into equal
protection analysis as it had developed to that point.
This constitutional interpretation of court cost and fee barriers in
Boddie quickly surfaced in several lower court cases.5' Commentators
immediately recognized the potential impact a broad interpretation of the
court's ruling could have.52 The Supreme Court, however, chose to read
the holding in Boddie narrowly. Certiorari was denied in a group of civil
16Id. at 374.471n concluding that the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amenament requires that
these appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into court to obtain a divorce, we
wish to re-emphasize that we go no further than necessay to dispose of the case'
before us.... We do not decide that acess for all individuals to the courts is a right
that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 382.
48See, e.g., Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways through the Legal Process: The Right of
Universal Acess to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 595 (1973); LaFrance,
Constitutional'Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J. 487; Note,
Indigent Access to Civil Courts: The Tiger is at the Gates, 26 VAND. L. REv. 25 (1973). See
generally Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights-Part 1, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153; Part 11, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527; Comment, The Heirs
of Boddie: Court Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 571
(1973); Note, Constitutionality of Cost and Fee Barriers for Indigent Litigants: Searching for
the Remains of Boddie after a Kras Landing, 48 IND. L.J. 452 (1973); Note, Free Access to the
Civil Courts as a Fundamental Constitutional Right: The Waiving of Filing Fees for
Indigents, 8 NEw ENG. L. REv. 275 (1973).
49In a very real sense, a civil plaintiff might be characterized as a likely candidate for
least favored in terms of a hierarchy of constitutional protection-certainly below criminal
defendants. But see Lester v. Lester, 69 Misc. 2d 528, 330 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1972) where, in dicta,
the court stated that, if demonstrated that an inexpensive alternative is not available,
"effective" access may be constitutionally guaranteed, i.e., at state expense. See also Hotel
Martha Washington Management Co. v. Swinick, 66 Misc. 2d 833, 322 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1971); note
65 infra & text accompanying.
50401 U.S. at 383.
5 1See, e.g., In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Application of Ottman, 336 F.
Supp. 746 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Naron, 334 F. Supp. 1150 (D. Or. 1971); In re Smith, 323 F.
Supp. 1082 (D. Colo. 1971).
52See generally note 48 supra.
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litigation access cases weeks after Boddie was handed down, under Meltzer
v. C. Buck LeCraw.55 Another major barrier to expansionist ideas was
erected by the Court in United States v. Kras,54 a case upholding fee
requirements prior to the obtaining of a discharge in bankruptcy. The
effect of the decision was to indicate, over vigorous dissents, 55 that access to
courts was not in all cases a fundamental right-a crucial distinction
considering the established two-tier analysis.56 Further, the "privilege" of
bankruptcy was not of the same constitutional significance as marriage or
its dissolution.57 This decision, in connection with the Court's holding in
Ortwein v. Schwab,5 halted any further movement toward a broad ranging
constitutional guarantee of access to courts in a civil context.
What emerges from the court's analysis in Person is the joining of the
classification of "less affluent," 59 which is not a suspect class but which
does deserve special attention, with an interest in meaningful access to
courts for civil litigation, which is apparently not a fundamental or
constitutionally guaranteed right, but which is of increased concern to
courts. Although the strict scrutiny test utilized in connection with a
suspect class or fundamental interest is not available, the equal protection
test to incorporate these considerations should be, as the Person court
agreed, one of a heightened scrutiny, or a "means with bite" test first
suggested by Professor Gunther. 60 This is a proper test to be applied to a
constitutional challenge to the Code of Professional Responsibility rule.6'
However, several facts prevent a comfortable fit into the above discussed
cases.
53402 U.S. 954 (1971). Of particular interest is Mr. Justice Black's dissent. He could find
no reason for distinguishing Boddie from the cases at hand, especially one (Kaufman v.
Carter) in which an indigent mother was denied court-appointed counsel in an action to
remove her as an unfit mother. Mr. Justice Black wrote:
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can safety rest on only one crucial
foundation-that the civil courts of the United States belong to the people of the
United States and each of the States belong to the people of this country and that no
person can be denied access to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal, because
he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney
... [I]n my judgment Boddie cannot and should not be limited to either its facts or
its language, and I believe there can be doubt that this country can afford to provide
court costs and lawyers to Americans who are now barred by their poverty from
resort to the law for resolution of their disputes.
Id. at 955. See also Carter v. Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 383, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970); In re Ella
B, 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 288, 334 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1972).
54409 U.S. 434 (1973).55 1d. at 451, 457, 458.56See note 32 supra.
57409 U.S. at 444-45.
58410 U.S. 656 (1973) (appellants not denied due process when twenty-five dollar filing
fee maintained in order to prosecute an appeal of decrease in welfare benefits).59This may not even be a classification. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 19-23 (1973); 411 U.S. at 62 (Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion); 411 U.S. at 69-
70 (Mr. Justice White's dissent); 411 U.S. at 91-97 (Mr. Justice Marhsall's dissent).60Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for





An effective way to recognize these differences is to examine the
alternatives if the rule is declared unconstitutional and compare these with
results obtaining in other access cases. In the Griffin-Douglas-Boddie
situation,62 once a party has been designated indigent, the costs and fees are
paid for him, presumably from state funds. Militating against a broader
application of such a result, such as paying expert witness fees, is that this
is essentially a welfare program. It is income redistribution and therefore
appropriate for legislative but not affirmative judicial action.63
Should the rule be found to be unconstitutional, the effect should be to
make contingency payments lawful in principle. This alternative would
involve neither a determination of indigency of particular litigants the
problems involved in class definition, nor would it require a state subsidy.
If allowed, it would be an available alternative to all litigants. 64 Further,
eliminating the contingency prohibition could be favorably characterized
as a proper, socially cost-free act of the judiciary, responding to its own
rules and not infringing on the legislative domain.
On the other hand, court access is not really being denied by
application of the CPR rule. The problem raised in Person is not entrance
into the judicial process; rather it involves effectiveness of access, what has
been described as including equipage.65 This is a step toward affirmative
equalization by the court,66 and could possibly lead to regulation of
attorney's fees and to other perhaps more obnoxious limitations.
Nevertheless, the court in Person applies a heightened scrutiny test to
the rule and finds its prohibititon of contingent payment to be "too
irrational to survive Fourteenth Amendment analysis. ' 67
It is crucial to note that under this analysis, the framing of the purpose
can be finally dispositive of the constitutional question. 68 The court states
the purpose of Rule 7-109 to be "to remove an incentive to untruthful testi-
mony." 69 While this certainly is a purpose, there remains an alternative
and broader characterization of the rule's purpose.
62See notes 38-50 supra & text accompanying.
63See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights-Part 1, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1153.
64Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax overturned as to
all citizens of Virginia rather than merely as to indigent voters).
6 5Equipage would include fees of counsel, witnesses, stenographers, transcripts, etc. The
problem involved in such a program are myriad. Major among them is that such a provision
would place the judiciary in an inappropriate role-providing affirmative relief for litigants
in the form of subsidization. Judicial payment of access fees might only be the beginning. For
an excellent discussion of these concepts in light of Boddie, Kras and Ortwein see Michelman,
The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights-Part I,
1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1163-69.
66See -Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw, 402 U.S. 954 (1971).
67414 F. Supp. at 146.
68But cf. Gunther, supra note 60, at 21. The Gunther analysis concerns itself more with
means than ends.
69414 F. Supp. at 146.
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At the outset it should be noted that the Code of Professional
Responsibility is not a general statute; rather it is an ethical code for
attorneys. The source of a stated purpose, a necessity in initiating equal
protection analysis, is not to be found in the usual source, legislative
history. Here the document itself provides the insight. In most states
where the Code is adopted, the entire Code, including the Preamble, is
followed. The Preamble indicates the broader scope:
But in the last analysis it is the desire for respect and confidence of the
members of his profession and of the society which he serves that should
provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence is the ultimate
sanction.70
It is not necessary in a contingency fee arrangement, then, for there to be
actual perjury. It is enough that the incentive be apparent. By its
existence, it calls into question the integrity of the judicial proceedings and
all participants.
The court in Person reasons: "No basis in reason exists for rejecting a
reasonable fee arrangement simply because the fee is not to be paid if the
client does not prevail in the case."' T The reasoning seems appealing.
There remains, however, a basic problem in interpretation. Of particular
import is the phrase "the fee is not to be paid if the client does not prevail."
That fact inevitably will affect, even if only subconsciously, a potential
witness. 72 Once this is recognized, the legitimacy of the testimony is open
to question.
There is a tension within Rule 7-109, the prohibition of contingent
payment and the express provision for payment of reasonable fees to
experts. It is not a proper interpretation of the rule to limit payments to
experts by reasonableness whether contingent or not-to allow a con-
tingent fee to an expert if it is demonstrated to be reasonable. Such an
interpretation implies that the rule's prohibition is solely to assure
reasonableness. But reasonableness of witness fees is not the ultimate
objective of the rule; maintaining the integrity of the judicial process is.
While it can be argued that the rule is relatively ineffective in preventing
such fee arrangements, sanctioning them would likely cause the loss of the
respect and confidence which the entire Code was drafted to protect.7 3
Though a disparate effect may be shown, under prevailing Supreme Court
decisions74 and under a proper interpretation of the Code of Professional
70ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble IC (1975).
71414 F. Supp. at 146.
72See, e.g., 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRAcTrs § 1430 (1962).
7SThough the foregoing provides a substantial challenge to the court's reasoning in
Person, it appears from the opinion that the Bar Association chose to argue that the grant of a
declaratory judgment was improper and that no constitutional question was presented.74See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976), where the Court states that
when judging a facially neutral law which impacts disproportionately on a particular race




Responsibility rule's purpose, the absolute prohibition of the rule should
survive even under the appropriate heightened scrutiny of equal protection
challenge.
REMEDIES
Despite the fact that an acceptable defense can be raised to a
constitutional challenge, there remains the problem of the litigant who
hesitates in entering the judicial process because of a lack of funds, as well
as the meritorious claimant who is defeated simply because of the
superiority of an opponent's experts.7 5 In fact, even if the rule is found
constitutionally defective, the long and developed common law and public
policy arguments against contingent payments pose a substantial barrier to
the immediate use of such arrangements. 7 6
Perhaps a root. of the problem and a true point of contention is Rule 7-
109's express provision for payment to experts." Just as undeniable as the
subconscious incentive to perjure or exaggerate if the fee is contingent, is
the knowledge of the retained expert as to who has employed him and for
what purpose. The problem remains incurable so long as experts are
acting "for" a party in an adversarial sense. Further, though the inference
of complicity is not as strong as in a contingent arrangement, the taint of
"purchased" testimony is, nonetheless, a fact quickly recognized by jury
and judge.7 8
Thus, any remedy to be fashioned must effectively deal with these two
problems: financing of the still-needed experts by low and middle-income
litigants and the improper, inefficient and wasteful use of experts in our
present system.7 9
A form of court-appointed, impartial expert is best suited to resolve
these problems. As the bulk of experimentation with such plans has been
in the area of medical testimony, 80 the discussion will rely on such plans
75As the court in Person notes, an attorney can avoid any problems by refusing the case,
while no such alternative is available to the litigant. 414 F. Supp. at 145.76
"It is not meant to suggest that in the case of the expert a fee measured as a percentage of
the recovery might not generally or in particular cases be regarded as per se unreasonable."
414 F. Supp. at 146.
77"An incentive to untruthful testimony is implicit in any payment to a witness 'for' his
testimony." 414 F. Supp. at 146.
78Ford & Holmes, The Professional Medical Advocate, 17 Sw. L.J. 551 (1963). This
may mean that the expert's testimony will be unduly discounted by the jury. It also weakens
the legitimacy of the trial process.
79For a discussion of the inherent problems of partisan experts, including reduction of
litigation into a "battle of experts" and the inappropriateness of the adversary proceeding to
sound scientific fact finding, see M. GUTrMACHER & H. WEIHOFFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW
205-268 (1952); Elliot & Spellman, Mediacal Testimony in Personal Injury Cases, 2 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 466 (1935); Polsky, Expert Testimony: Problems in Jurisprudence, 34 TEMP.
L.Q. 357 (1961).
BPlpns have been implemented by local court rules in numerous jurisdictions including:
New York, Baltimore, Philadelphia (Eastern Dist. of Pennsylvana), Western District of
Pennsylvania, Missesota, Northern District of Illinois, Los Angeles, Utah and Cleveland. For
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and reported results,8 1 though broader coverage to include all professions is
appropriate.82
The concept of the court appointed expert is not new.8 There is and
has been statutory authority for judges to summon experts who, in the
court's opinion, are necessary to the proper resolution of a particular
action. 84  Such statutes, however, have not been heavily used. 85 This
seeming lack of interest may stem from basic philisophical differences as to
the proper role of the judge-as an active participant, not only in matters
of law but also in evidence, 86 or a mere umpire, restraining any fact finding
ventures.87 From a public policy standpoint, the former, due to its greater
potential for factually-based, as opposed to adversarially promoted, results
is preferable.
The appropriate role of the judge is but one source of criticism of any
court appointment plan. Several of these require further inspection. It is
argued that once a witness has been designated as court appointed, there is
a tendency for a trier of fact to assume infallability.88  While this
underestimates the interpretive powers of jury members, there is a risk that
short discussions of several of these plans, see Myers, "The Battle of Experts:" A New
Approach to an Old Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV. 539, 562-77 (1965). See
generally note 81 infra.
81C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 17 (2d ed. 1972); Barr, Medical Testimony: Doctors and
Lawyers Cooperate, 41 J. AM. Jud. Soc. 78 (1957); Botein, The New York Medical Expert
Testimony Project, 33 U. DET. L. REV. 388 (1956); Frankel, The Use of Disinterested Medical
Testimony, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 93 (1958); Martin, The Impartial Medical Testimony Project,
28 INS. COUNSEL J. 612 (1961); Myers, "The Battle of Experts": A New Approach to an Old
Problem in Medical Testimony, 44 NEB. L. REV. 539 (1965); Peck, Impartial Medical
Testimony, 22 F.R.D. 21 (1958); Van Dusen, The Impartial Medical Expert System: The
Judicial Point of View, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386 (1961). See also SPECIAL COMMITrEE OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK ON THE MEDICAL EXPERT TESTIMONY
PROJECT, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY (1956) [hereinafter cited as IMPARTIAL MEDICAL
TESTIMONY]; 82 REPORTS OF AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 184-85 (1957) (House of Delegates'
approval of a resolution encouraging the development of impartial expert witness panels for
personal injury litigation).
82 UNIFORM EXPERT TESTIMONY ACT, in HANDBOOK OF THE CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 337 (1937).
81For an excellent discussion of the history of the expert in litigation, see Hand,
Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40
(1901); Rosenthal, The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 L. & CONTEMP. PROB.
403 (1935). See also Hart v. Community School Bd. of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 762-67
(1974).84See, e.g., the use of court appointment by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United
States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 520 (D. Mass. 1968). See also FED. R. EVID. 706; CALIF. EVID.
CODE § 730 et seq. (West 1966); Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV. L. REV.
1105 (1941); Note, Opinion and Expert Evidence under the Federal Rules, 36 LA. L. REV.
123, 136-38 (1975); Note, The Trial Judge's Use of His Power to Call Witnesses-An Aid to
Adversary Presentation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1957).
85Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 S.
CAL. L. REV. 195 (1956).86See, e.g., Scott v. Spanjer Bros. Inc., 298 F.2d 928, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1962).87Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 425 (1961).8 8Id. at 424-29.
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a jury will tend to accept an expert's opinion without substantial question,
especially in a matter involving high level, technically sophisticated
information. Some feel that such a result effectively supplants the seventh
amendment right to trial by jury. 9 They buttress this argument by
alleging the ocurt designation of a witness as expert further erodes the fact
finding province of the jury.
Another problem raised often is tht one expert alone could never
properly reflect the many schools of thought a discipline might contain. 90
The witness will naturally reflect his personal biases, the argument
continues, and discount other possible views thus burdening one party to
the action with an unfavorable, yet powerful witness. In short, the attorney
is likely to find protection in sheer numbers of experts, and the jury will
properly refine the mass of information and arrive at a proper disposition.
Finally, and most important to this discussion, is the problem of financing
such a venture.
A careful drafting of any remedial plan can eliminate many of these
problems. First, it should preclude the possibility of a judge actually
calling a specific witness as an expert. Rather, once it is recognized that an
expert will be required, 91 the judge would request from a court admini-
strator the assignment of an expert from a panel of previously screened,
highly qualified and acceptable candidates.92 Ideally, little or no contact
between judge or attorney and the expert would be allowed at that point so
that no possible influence could exist. This would assure a witness
unconnected with any party.
93
While a carefully drawn plan may go far in assuring capability and
impartiality, there remains the very basic problem of litigation costs and
disparity in means. If, for example, the fees of the expert witness are taxes
as costs to the loser, 94 too high a barrier to nonfrivolous litigation may still
exist. The New York plan resolved this problem by creating a fund out of
89But cf. Exhibit A, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 386, 396 (1961), where a constitutional defense of the
rule adopted by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is set forth.90Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416, 421-24 (1961). See
also Scott v. Spanjer Bros., 298 F.2d 928, 932 (2nd Cir. 1962).
91Such a determination may be made as the result of a pretrial conference. Under the
Los Angeles plan, the need is determined by a pretrial judge who generally does not conduct
the trial, thus further protecting both the witness and the judge. See Note, The Doctor in
Court: Impartial Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 728, 733 (1967). There are
conflicting opinions as to who, judge or attorney, should have final approval for specific
witnesses. But see note 92 infra.
92Local universities have provided pools of qualified experts as have local professional
organizations. Any plan should preclude, through proper screening and extensive rotation,
any identification with a particular class of litigating parties (e.g., plaintiffs, defendants,
insurance companies, etc.).
95As to how the Los Angeles plan attempts to achieve the goal see Note, The Doctor in
Court: Impartial Medical Testimony, 40 S. CAL L. REv. 728, 729-34. The New York plan is
discussed in IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TEsTiMONY, supra note 81, at 15-16.
9'This is the case in both the Western District rule and the Eastern District (Philadelphia
Federal) rule in Pennsylvania set out in Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 390, 395 N.3 (1964).
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which expert fees were paid, incorporating these costs into the normal
operating expenses of the court.95 Such a plan is desirable in that the onus
of one party paying for the witness is eliminated and economic inequality
would be corrected without any equal protection problems of where to
draw the line as to who receives the benefits. 96 It would be preferable for
such a plan to be established by the appropriate legislative body to avoid
charges of judicial overreaching. Further, the amounts necessary to budget
such a plan over all fields of experts could quickly grow quite large.9 7 An
equitable plan would split the cost between contesting parties equally.
This would eliminate the cost to the state and would likely not be viewed
as court legislation.
An interesting and workable alternative is possible in establishing a
rule that only if an expert is actually called at trial would fees be assessed-
pretrial work would be funded by the state. Such a plan would give
litigants access to the valuable work of the expert. They could then weigh
the value of eventual testimony and make a decision. Eliminated would be
the incentive and the opportunity to "show" experts in order to impress the
jury.98
It is at pretrial that the additional benefits of this plan are realized. One
of the most favorable results of the medical plans has been the dramatic
increase in out-of-court settlements prior to trial with an attendant decrease
in costs to litigants and the court both. The reported statistics are
impressive.9 9 An ancillary benefit is the potential clearing of overcrowded
civil court dockets. 00
Should a case proceed to trial, the expert is in a new position. His
monetary bias now eliminated, no one can question his allegiance. He is
there for one purpose, to discuss his findings. Assuming a proper
screening, there should be neither any challenge to his credentials nor his
relationship to either litigating party. Overall, the shift in emphasis would
be from surprise, calculating strategy and dramatic showmanship to careful
scrutiny, analysis and questioning of the facts presented.
CONCLUSION
The use of experts in litigation has become almost a fixture in many
areas-antitrust, condemnation, desegregation, malfunction and defects in
95 IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 81, at 26, 38.
96See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection Due Process Standards and the
Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REV. 223, 263 (1970).97A major benefit and justification, however, lies in the fact that reported results
demonstrate that such plans can save more in terms of settlements and decreased litigation costs
than is spent on financing the plans. See IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 81. at
34-35.
981t is not clear that the court could preclude a party from calling additional experts,
although this is certainly to be discouraged as inimical to the proper function of the plan.
99IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 81, at 28-32.
100ld. at 32-34.
[Vol. 52:671
1977] CONTINGENT COMPENSATION 687
design in products liability, malpractice in an increasing number of
professions, obscenity control, patent and copyright, probate-the list
continues. Contemporaneous with the growth of the use of expert
witnesses has been the development of the statutory and common law
prohibition against payments to such witnesses contingent on content of
testimony or outcome of the action. The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility DR 7-109 reflects the judicial concern expressed in this area. The
concerns and problems it was drafted to remedy are real. No less real,
however, are the needs of the less affluent litigant as the court in Person
forcefully points up. To accomplish a solution to these conflicting
problems, a basic change in the conduct of civil proceedings in required.
This change, in the form of the impartial expert, will likely be slow in
finding general acceptance. But in this age of increasing sophistication in
litigation, such a remedy is required or the judicial process may become an
olportuni(y reserved only for the affluent.
REED E. SCHAPER

